tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 27, 2015 7:00am-9:01am EDT
>> one thing to remember about presidential presidents is that they are the exception. [laughs] >> thank you all for coming today. this is a wonderful event. it's been said that heaven is a library. if that's the case, heaven has gone outside and we are in heaven if the book festival. >> an article trying to shoe that we have this red-blue map.
the divide was a little divide. there were political scientists that were just in town. the idea that this country itself is just wrong. i don't know a single political scientist that believes that. >> all realize that whatever they've done in life is something that ought to be recorded and passed on to the next generation. that's the way we learn, we learn by trying to understand the past. all of us have a past. >> you really only focused titan. >> this is a great question that goes to the heart of all the questions that we we talk about. we realize that there's no way that we could tell the whole story.
of course, the telephone book is not a story. >> i think all the opportunities are open for women now. when i was in law school, i graduated in 1967 there were 13 women in the class of 500. today they're 50/50. >> you never like people that put profit above the public good, and his view belong to the american people for generations unborn and they need to be handed on as places to awaken the spirit. >> i made a career out of my love for books and to help spread that love, i helped to found the texas festival and now national book festival. i never thought i would write a book, certainly not about myself. >> the goal was in some ways a
sense -- a sense of urgency to go to the older people in our families and get the stories before it's too late to be able to -- i had a father and daughter who both came together and after hearing about the book, the daughter said to the father, i'm talking you to the coffee shop and you're going to tell me the story. >> history looks back, 30-plus million people. that's going to be quite a change, quite, you know, a martin luther king change. i think that was a bonding between justice. the important thing is to pass. once you pas it, it's easier to
go back and fix it. >> to bring back the dead. i try to do not only with the outside speakers that you're familiar, but also ores -- others that are less familiar. >> there's no big person, you know, to go back to easily so i'm bringing all my guys in the room at the same time and write about leadership. that's really what i care about underneath it all. oh, thank you. >> c-span is going to have questions from c-span and c-span will now -- >> now a look at nuclear power safety and security specially
china, south korea and japan. changes to nuclear power plant since the 2011 meltdown in the fukushima nuclear power plant. this is an hour and a half. >> okay. well, good afternoon, everyone. i'm the director here delighted to see all of you in this beautiful summer day. there are lots of folks trying to get lunch and get seated but i will get started because i know we're starting a little bit already behind schedule, so please cooperate with me and try to get the program started and get everyone seated as best we can. pleasure to have jim plat here today. jim has been an east-west fellow
visiting with nuclear engining and he can deal with some of the technical issues, but also the larger issues, in a way he's well suited to do that because he's been looking a subject for a while. he spent about a year in japan looking with japanese nuclear authorities and japanese companies and others exploring this topic. he spent a will the of time interviewing folks in korea and made trips to china as well. delighted to have you, jim. i can't think of a better context to be taking off this topic. japan has restarted a couple of its nuclear reactors but there's a larger issue of the direction of japan's nuclear program. the president will come to washington soon and announced
initiative with northeast asia corporation whichs which has cin energy component. it's a particular time in asia pacific relations, which has been to say the at least complicated within the last several years, maybe last year or so and also emphasis on emergency and power as well. the overall topics for jim's topic is very timely and delighted to have him and you discuss. let me lay a couple of ground rules. today's program is completely on the record and it is being web cast live and we are also on
c-span today. please know that as we move into the q & a section. jim has a powerpoint. we will open up the time run to go 1:30 sharp close. to remind you, identify and your affiliation and we will try to make as many of those. take it away. your show. >> thank you for a very kind introduction and thanks everyone here and out in the back. i hope everyone can hear me. thanks for c-span for coming and putting me very much on the record here. but, you know, i'm just a visiting fellow so i don't have anything too controversial to
say. i'm going to be talking about nuclear safety cooperations in knot east asia. the state of it or the lack of cooperation maybe some of the details of what kind of cooperation can be built in northeast asia. but i also come at this with a larger history of looking at nuclear power in the region, security and nonplif -- proliferation as well. we'll see by the time we get to the end the cooperation there's a lot of opportunity for cooperation so look forward to discussing it with y'all, maybe you can give me some ideas of where to go next on my research on the topic. first i'm going to outline in my
talk, give a context of the state of nuclear power in the region, both reactors and fuel cycle, then we will look at the northeast asia peace initiative which is announced from the south korean government, the current administration. they have these little fancy pamphlets online. i don't want to spend a lot of time on it but i will briefly go over and whether i think it's a type of model that could be replicated or should be replicated in northeast asia. finally wrap up with some of my own conclusions or recommendations. but then i look forward to the q
& a with everyone. first to look at the current situation and nuclear power in the region. the region was an early adopter of nuclear power mostly in japan starting in 1960s. the orange is japan. i do want to point out this is operationals no necessarily operating. reactors that are not in long-term permanent shutdown. so we see japan is the early adapter and really growing. south korea coming out in the late '70s has grown up in the years. china starting in the mid-90's going on a construction pattern now. china is leading growth in the
region, really in the world. i'll talk a little bit more about japan since they have a situation about where they're going to go with their sector. but just to say that there's a lot of reactors in the region and heavy dependence on nuclear power. so still -- i want to make sure everyone -- this is operational. the current number of reactors, china and south korea there are in the mid-20's. reactors under construction in japan is unclear what will happen with them. china and south korea have several reactors. china have a few dozen under construction. quite an ambitious schedule.
some are around not quite a quarter of current operational reactors in the region. the density is continue to rise in the region. really with all nuclear plants or thermal power plants it needs to be located near a source of water so they are in the coastal regions, china, korea, and you see japan on the right-hand side. sister reactor at the site, will probably start next month or next couple of months or so. we'll see what happens with other reactors. as far as nuclear generation in the region, and it's important,
all three of these states are really tagged nuclear power as vital for their energy mix, for various reasons. energy security reasons, climate reasons, even maybe greater strategic reasons, reasons if you want to discuss that as well. but particular japan and south korea being very poor in domestic natural resources. nuclear the way to grantee their natural resources. 30% of south korea's power came from nuclear. big zero for japan. japan was at 30%. china has a few percent of it
overall, but again with the size of chinese market it's hard to get to that 30% level that japan and to the south korea had. i want to be clear on what i want by nuclear cycle, that basically start from mining uranium and put it into a reactor and generate electricity, the waste that you produce on that, it's back end of the cycle. either what's call reprocessing or recycling where it's been processed again and been fed to the reactor, and but you have to
process of doing and the waste goes straight to depository. in theory no country really has a solid idea yet of how to handle their waste, but it's an enduring problem in the region. japan has had a close cycle that includes reprocessing. it's been a big controversial. it's been wholly developed. enretch midnight reprocessing where special nuclear materials are made, and that can be used for weapons or for reactor fuel. i of course, focus on the reactor side of it, but it's hard to separate the two
aspects. there's been talk about cooperation on that aspect as well. i will get into that a little bit. i think that's much more challenging. and, of course, everyone, you talk about nuclear in asia and the japan situation comes up. i wanted to go over this briefly. as china and south korea seem pretty solid in commitment to nuclear power and moving forward with it, japan after the fukushima accident eventually shutdown all of the reactors. they shutdown 13 months for review. by the end of 2012ish they all had shutdown, but then all of last year all had shutdown again, while they were making new regulation. basically for a few years there there was no regulatory basis to
restart the reactors except for special ordered by the prime minister. but, of course, changed from the democratic party of japan to liberal party of japan and prime minister abe in strongest way possible supported nuclear power. some of the public reaction to it makes them not be so outward for it, but they have supported it and put out a plan in june that they want 20-22% of electricity. looking at the number, that's about 29 reactors. 25 so far applied for restart. one has restarted. the plan is quite ambitious.
more than that, it may assume that there's going to be new construction or life-time extensions, because right now the regular intlaición is 40 years the layoff -- life of a reactor in japan. there's been discussion on doing this, publicly that's going to be a very sensitive topic and i'm not quite sure how the regulator in japan is going to justify the life-extensions. and that's done at a site called rekosho. i shouldn't say it's done at because it's never been open. it plans to be done there. the construction just finished about 2011 and then it had to be
shutdown and new regulations were put out. as far as i know, they're not inspecting that site yet. not surprisingly the japanese regulator is completely flooded with reactor inspections and they simply don't have the capacity to be looking at everything right now. but there's still plans on the books for open march of next year, but it's been opening for about 13 years now. so i'm not convinced it's going to open next year, but still the government is committed to that. what they are facing -- i don't know how well you can see that. it didn't turn out too well for him, but i show this pick your one because the national polling shows that the japanese people are still a majority antinuclear, that they want to
faze out nuclear, there are a few people and they are all old, this is kind of emblem -- emblematic. it's not occurring at the polls either. democratic party has won for the lower house. i don't know how the japanese public if they say they oppose nuclear power and don't demonstrate how that's actually going to demonstrate getting nuclear power to faze out. they have moved to putting in court challenges. the court in -- t a/k/a hama
reactor is. t a/k/a hama had received authorization from the japanese regulator, the judge accepted it and said the reactor could not restart because the regulations are not good enough. the owner of pla plant has challenged it and will go through challenge process. in my opinion, the challenge will likely -- the appeal will win and it will eventually start. it maybe moving to the towards to try and challenge the restart. specially, they have one president but i've also -- that judge moved. i don't know why but he moved. i don't know how much the president is going to last now.
i think hopefully hahs -- that's why there's an interest and focus on reactors of the region lately. cot -- south korean president announced. she named asia's paradox. there's very little or immature political security cooperation in the region to deal with some of the tough issues. she had this trust policy about building trust with north korea. we will build trust and confidence by dealing with soft issues first such as disaster relief, nuclear safety, counterterrorism, cyber security
and environment. very easy to cooperate, maybe not. and so the proposal says we will do this, create greater peace in the region. i know that this is a big blog of test to put on a powerpoint slide, pretty much what it says on nuclear safety on the next pamphlet. i'll explain what that is. will be launched in northeast asia among the free countries.
that's all it says which is pretty vague on exactly what they had in mind. it might be purposely vague or it could be a vine that the administration didn't have idea on safety. herein is part mentioning nuclear safety. when i looked at it this year from ten days ago, i didn't see a nuclear safety mentioned, but please someone correct me if i was wrong on that, basically she says there's a lot of nuclear power plants in the region and this is a threat to regional safety, so just like europe
started and we will use nuclear safety as an issue to build regional trust and integration and propose -- it's a typo -- create a body for nuclear safety in northeast asia. [laughs] >> with participation open u.s., russia, north korea and mongolia , why open it up to these other members as well, or these oh -- other partners. we can talk about that. i'm going to go over.
there's so little about nuclear safety. this grand vision for creating integration in northeast asia. it's related to korean dialogue. trust policy with north korea, at least in the q & a in the back. why now? obviously fukushima has brought the issue to the floor, but there's also the pattern of proposing this sort of regional and cooperation. they get five-year term and they seem to have a tendency to come into office and distinguish themselves from pred -- predecessor by announcing the
plans. making a plan every five years is not a good way to actually achieve regionalization. another thing, korean presidents have a tendency to leave office with terrible ratings. this is a new way that the president distinguishes himself or herself from the predecessors. but i also think that this requires any sort of serious commitment to a regional organization must go across multiple administrations. i also think it's a good question if korea announces, does china and japan accept korea in the leadership. some of you probably know korea has tendency of being shrimp
between two whales. i'm not sure the region is ready for korean leadership, but we'll see. and it's also been when i talk from some other people from the region what do you think about napsi. the first question book is what is napsi. regional cooperation is necessary and necessary to start it now. but that's going to be a big task. i've done a lot of work on asia. i'm not as familiar with europe, this has been interesting to learn a little bit more about
europe. so the treaty was signed in 1957, came into force in 1958. members, netherlands, italy, west germany. when a new state enters the eu they must enter the treaty. it's key objective is essentially they wanted to promote nonproliferation and the nuclear sector in the region. as this was starting at a time where nuclear power was in infancy in europe, they wanted to join region, industrialization, they made supply agency to grantee supply
of uranium. that perception has not held true. uranium, we continue to find more uranium, more viable resources. but a big thing on it was safe guard. this also was a time where the international atomic agency which is the global nuclear safe guard body had just started. it was not really strong and robust yet. now, the u.s. didn't necessarily push it but being u.s. was more on nuclear in the industry, much more dominant player at the time, they wanted to promote nuclear power but also in away that did not spread nuclear weapons to both allies and
but i look at all of these things and think this is a tall hill to climb in northeast asia. there is no asian court of justice. there is no supply agency that we take ownership of nuclear materials. so also as far as making something binding in asia there's a lot more that needs to be built to make it actually binding and enforceable. it's quite impressive but it's also unique. i can imagine this a little bit but basically a nonproliferation and promoting civilian nuclear were too mingles in addition to general to the conference in the region. this also called the theory of creating a european military force. so those pushing european integration like jonbenet were concerned we need to get some big issue to go and nuclear was one of them.
a note on the safeguards. i know military stuff is exempted but really interesting that inspectors have access to nuclear sites and nuclear weapon states. iaea inspectors did not have access. they did not have to be given access to nuclear facilities in any treaty nuclear weapons state. so the safeguards are stronger than the iaea once. they work together to serve tlingit what the inspection responsibilities will be. i can when i think of northeast asia, if you want to build a similar system, having a cooperative inspection regime that would include access to chinese nuclear facilities against things to be quite difficult to achieve. i think sounds good but this actually is very ambitious. and it also i'm actually its
industrial side wasn't as successful as it wanted because eventually the goal goals from countries conflict and adopting u.s. reactor technology. but all of adopted from westinghouse our combustion engineering. it also couldn't really agree necessarily on one fuel supply system. so i put up the uranium enrichment corporations. diverse what is german lead. the second one is french lead. they are examples of some collaboration that can occur but your atoms didn't pull quite as strong as creating european enrichment agency. they done some stuff. would've because projects is on fusion reactors. i've mentioned a couple of these things.
let's cut their europe in the 1950s, mid 1950s, western europe with northeast asia now. there are some sellers if you look we'll hard but there's major difference is too. europe at this time is coming out of two global wars, two major wars in its region are as satu mentioned, 500 years of war which adorn the continent apart and i just entered into a time where we feared another global war will occur in the cold war. we can talk about the division of korea being a vestige of the cold war but is not the cold war. it is not nuclear armageddon for the world. and to our historical issues that remain, but we are quite away from the tension of world war ii. something they secure the situation while there are problems is not like western europe in the 1950s.
, western europe also come at the time was blessed with some leaders that were very committed to political integration. i don't see those leaders currently in northeast asia. and i mean really you are making your whole career out of doing political integration in the region. the nonproliferation concern about france and west germany, about containing those programs, in east asia now you've got china, the npt weapon state. you can't, i mean, i don't know what there is to contain on its or graham. may be concerned that japan or south korea to develop nuclear weapons. i personally think those are overblown particularly with the u.s. alliance and nuclear umbrella provided by the. so i don't think there's quite the same level of proliferation concern among japan, south korea and china as there wasn't western europe. at all three countries in
northeast asia quite a long experience now with nuclear power. they don't necessarily need a uranium supply agency or technology cooperation because they've already done that with other partners, they've already secured supplies of uranium. so i think again i would really reiterate, like brazil and argentina have a safeguard system. that's about the closest i think you can come to another euratom type arrangement. and also think you try to start euratom in europe today it may not happen. europe has settled with creating other integrated and cooperative bodies since that initial push in the '50s. i think it would be just too tough to create euratom today, in europe much less other regions. woebegone to some existing
cooperative mechanisms, and here's a whole bunch of acronyms of organizations that you may or may not have heard of. before for nuclear cooperation in asia, minister level meetings, they do basic research is to also talk about nuclear safety. there's asia pacific regional cooperative agreement, and again cooperation on nuclear r&d. these are the two -- no. the rca is iaea and the asian acoustic and that work is also under iaea. again, showing nuclear safety information, stunted satellite what is this new body proposed by napci going to do if there is organizations that do it? the asia-pacific safeguards network begin to talk about the safeguards. i should point out all these organizations include countries in southeast asia, some oceana,
maybe south asia as well. so it's much larger than just japan, south korea and china. those three country member of all but they do very large memberships and i think that a lot of it is focused on the experience of nuclear country can tell the countries looking to the nuclear power what to do, how do we do nuclear. how do nuclear safety, how do we do nuclear security and safeguard. not necessarily cooperation among the extent nuclear countries, but also to be blunt, a lot of these i think are kind of talk shop. you come and talk about things but there is no enforcement of it or really have some sort check to make sure to talk about is going to be put in practice. so i think this kind is to the cooperation is good, talking but
it is good but what does it mean in the end. so maybe that's where the napci proposal is trying to get at. on the international level, the iaea also does this. the iaea has teamed the operational safety review teams them come in and inspect reactors to look at safety practices, safety culture to make sure it's in line with the iaea fundamentals of nuclear safety. again it's not binding but it's something out their countries want to get checked. the world association of nuclear operatives on the private sector level or i should say the nuclear operator level but they do peer review some information exchange. i start to get lost when figured out how these organizations do we need themselves because there seems to be a lot of overlapping functions. the convention on nuclear safety, again gives you some guidelines on nuclear safety and will do peer review's.
so if you want to talk about nuclear safety there's already a lot of for a in which to do it. which again i kind of wonder then what does napci want to get out of it? so napci particularly calls up his top regulation meeting which was established in 2008 among japan south korea and china. these are the current regulators industry minister of environmental protection, nuclear regulations authority and nuclear safety and security commission. the last two are new within the last few years. their newly independent agencies because previously the regulator was under the minister also promoting nuclear power which is a classic conflict of interest. so after fukushima and after some parts scandal, forged parts in south korea, these independent bodies were spun off. but again they are there to discuss nuclear safety issues.
and has napci said we want to expand. will bring more people in. they agreed on this in 2013. the first meeting of this in 2014, u.s. and russian delicate skin. the second meeting was a couple months later in korea. as far as i know u.s. delegation did not go to that one but russia, mongolia, france, the iaea, the nuclear energy agency was part of the organization for economic cooperation and development, and wano. it's hosted by the korean ministry of affairs. i don't know why finish of foreign affairs had to do but when this is a regulatory body, but anyway maybe it's part of his broader, will create dialogue in the region. also if you go to the website there is scant information of
what is actually talked about at these meetings. so in conclusion my first question after going through all this is euratom a good model? i think i've already kind of alluded i if not represent whati think i don't necessary think, i think euratom is a great organization. i just don't see how it's going to be replicated in northeast asia. nor do i necessarily see the need why. if euratom has safeguarded components, the iaea now does a good job on safeguards. there's no need to replicate that in northeast asia. apply and ownership of nuclear materials. japan has about 11 tons of plutonium in the country and about another 30 tons in europe. without the under ownership of such an agency? i'm not sure how exactly that would happen.
i think basically when you look at a lot of the reason for creating euratom, these function to be already occur in northeast asia or there's just very little motivation to actually do that. except maybe for the safety aspect, and that comes not only from the safety cooperation aspect being a bit lacking in northeast asia but also what the general publics are demanding right now. i think the publics in these countries are terribly concerned about safeguards but they are concerned about the safety of the facilities. so that makes we wonder so what is the goal for this nuclear consultative body? it's not stated in napci. is that accident prevention? is instead a common safety culture or common safety standard? which again those things and we talked about at the iaea or they can be talked about with wano or other organizations. but i put in italics the last one emergency preparedness, communication and management.
through talking with some people for the research and reading about it, i know in japan this really is a huge, huge issue of when there's another accident, not if but when there's another accident what is the plan to evacuate citizens and stabilize the accident? and there is existing, or enduring frustration from south korea and china that when the fukushima accident occurred, that they were not notified in a timely or effective manner. they did not receive full information of what's going on. now defe to be fair, the same criticism comes from even government officials within japan but we did know what was going on and we didn't have information in time. but i think this seems to be maybe the most common interest among the three countries, that when a nuclear accident occurs we know there will be image
problems for nuclear industries around the world but we don't want fiscal damage coming to our country. so if there's an accident from a coastal plant in northern china, korea does not want the damage from it coming over to korea. or if there's an accident in korea, say from around kashmir flowing down into japan. just to avoid that from happening and being told exactly what's going on at those nuclear facilities. and maybe some sort of joint response if it's trying to stabilize the reactor that's in crisis. so that's a push for is a focus on emergency management. i think it's a common interest and it's also going to be supported by the public in this region. and if you like what they put up to, it's kind of what a lot of the dialogue has been on.
i don't how far they've gone and implement but they've mentioned this. information exchange, to improve emergency communication, and korea invited china and japan to come observe an emergency exercise in 2014. i don't know exactly how that went. i think for some understandable reason a lot of the discussion takes place behind closed doors. sensitivities over nuclear are always high, so not necessarily want is everything that could go wrong and how we don't have the capability to respond. but they seem to be moving in this direction of improving communication and capabilities respond to emergencies. and it is talking about this so maybe this is the reason for inviting in the country, to bring in the u.s. and say it had a nuclear accident what is your
response procedure. or russia with the same. so in conclusion the discussion on euratom i just went all through, i could've done this in 1995. because there was proposals for this going back at least 20 years if not longer. back then they were very ambitious proposals to basically really re-create euratom in asia. it was hard to defend it's going to be harder to do now and there's been little progress toward that direction. but mitigating the effects of an accident, especially in the wake of the fukushima, seems to be a big mutual interest that we can actually build trust on because i also think that they can do some joint exercises, not just table talks without any field doing things that the real trust building happens. when you have people working with each other. as far as making something like
this last across political administrations may be taking it down to more of the working level is where something can sustain rather than being up to the whim of whatever leader is in charge of the country at the time. i still think it's an open question of what to do about the united states though. because at fukushima, japan asked the u.s. to help, and the u.s. navy played a critical role in figuring out how to save -- stabilize the reactor. i think certainly of another accident happens in japan the u.s. military would ask also to help out in some way. at least consult the u.s. brought other aspects of our regulars, the nuclear bigotry commission and the department of energy. he and south korea, as far as i know there hasn't been deep dialogue with u.s. forces, korea on this. but certainly the u.s. military on the korean peninsula would want to know what is happening at a nuclear accident.
at least be able to evacuate u.s. personnel. so this means i think we're talking about exercising on emergency management views military potentially involved in japan and korea. i don't think china would ask the us military to come help with an accident in its country. but if we're doing this exercise it needs to be worked out, what could the u.s. military be doing it is going to be naval assets involved, how do we make sure to this is some sort of tension over who does what. and just because u.s. naval assets are coming does it mean it's a threat to someone else. but this role for the us should give any future also needs to be worked out both bilaterally and among the region. for napci, well, you know, i think napci is a bold in its noble proposal, but this sort of
motivation to create an eu style cooperation, i don't think it's quite there yet in asia. i don't necessarily see that as a public i don't think you need to get to the european union to be able to have good cooperation in asia. but that sort of momentum if it's a series it needs to be sustained. also will close with i don't necessarily think that nuclear safety is a soft issue the way that it's characterized by napci. nuclear, you just a nuclear and it grabs a lot of people's attention and makes for a lot of sensitivity. and countries have different ways of dealing with it. i know that for china, they prefer to closed door meetings and they are more open to talks in closed sessions. the u.s. then will harp on transparency and you're not been transparent enough. but i think it just shows that you don't anything nuclear,
brings in the sense it is a different perceptions of how do we even talk about it. maybe some of the other issues in napci could be a little easier. and so that's the end of my talk. this is a picture of the fukushima reactors during the accident. it looks like building three, reactor three has just blown, or maybe it is building number two. anyway, i put it out not to harp on japan again for this. i don't think they need. it's not productive, but you sure this is what we are trying to prevent, and also the way the us and japan cooperated at the site during this accident, and actually during the entire tsunami is a good example of how countries can work together even on very sensitive and difficult issues. so thank you and i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> thank you very much, jim.
we don't have informal discussion today but if we took off the question, comments from the floor, let me just mention three things to sort of got stuck in the broader content of the talk which i thought were very hopeful and very interesting. one is while you concluded that euratom maybe wasn't the right model or a the right feature for thinking about northeast asia nuclear civil cooperation, at least in asia pacific international relations the question of european models comes up all the time and not just in the nuclear area but when there's political or diplomatic sentiment. i want this sort of thank you for suggesting this particular area of the central cooperation, the euratom model doesn't fit and may not even fit europe anymore which is a question we may think about him european terms into what's happened in ukraine and the great crisis. are the models that were developed after 45 if entity right for europe, much less i
think are the right to be adopted in asia? the second thing that didn't come up much in your conversation but i kept thinking about was napci and all the other elements focus on cooperation i'm always mindful in asia and particularly northeast asia, there's a heck of a lot of competition. this isn't just competition at the geopolitical or diplomatic level but at least in northeast asia, nuclear energy issue. one can't conceive of the time particularly as you is nuclear interest declines, european certainly declines through moratorium in italy and germany and elsewhere, all that, that the republic of korea and japan and china may will develop as key elements of the global market a supplier to nuclear, civilian nuclear technology, expertise. and so how would you square this cooperative element with the
competitive element? south korea in particular have been quite active to sell its capabilities. the final issue dealt, addresses the way you ended with maybe at the lowest denominator might be monitoring each other's safety, which is a kind of trust building given a northeast asia is trying to avoid crises, trying to avoid surprises that would -- maybe it's just been the nature of this past year but it just seems to me take it to this kind of granular cooperation requires a high level trust. and both public and political, it still seems to me there so much of an uphill struggle to get to a level of cooperative feelings that would inhibit such cooperation, no matter how valid
and useful it might be to address or stymie surprises such as in fukushima, et cetera. so those are just some comments. we have about 30 minutes for questions and answers from the floor. i would remind you can we are on the record, and live on both c-span and on the east-west center's website for a podcast. so please identify yourself and your affiliation imposing question or comment to jim who will handle all tough issues. yes, sir. the one to lead off, please? the mic will pick you up. >> just a pedestrian question. it seems obvious -- [inaudible] seems a pedestrian question would be that a country that has an expose nuclear plant would be more vulnerable in a military scenario or impact that could
affect obviously the entire country or the world. so when we threaten each other with nuclear it almost seems unnecessary we may have potential basel plans that could explode if there's a terrorist attack or something like that. so have you thought about that? have you been advising countries on how to protect themselves in those kind of scenarios? >> so to protect itself from terrorist attack on civilian nuclear -- so that's a nuclear security question. that's not, nuclear terrorism to be honest this is something i haven't looked at a lot, but something after 9/11 that the u.s. did, this is obviously a big concern for the united states is whether there's a nuclear, terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor that causes some sort of major accident. and response from u.s. regulators, the nuclear registry
commission wasn't unique to the, the nuclear facility needs to be prepared to guard against whatever they take your reactor out, whether its terrorist attack or natural disaster or human fault or whatever. so whatever systems, i think when you talk about building robust safety systems and robust security systems, you need to consider basic how to be guard against what's called loss of offsite power or what's called loss of coolant accident. and so you try and capture all those scenarios in those accident planning and in a safety standards that you sent by it. be at a safety or a security issue. certainly if there's as you mention if there is some sort of terrorist attack on a civilian nuclear plant that leads to offsite release of radiation, it
will type the emergency responders in the area in that country that maybe could leave it vulnerable in other places. but i will say that breaking a nuclear plant, just too colloquial put it, breaking a nuclear plant where your opening up all the containment levels continued to get radiation out is not easy to do. at fukushima, fukushima revealed a lot of safety culture regulatory practice, site design flaws in japan. but it did take a historic earthquake and tsunami to disable that reactor. so when i tried to think of what type of cyber attack, say, would be necessary to produce a similar result on a nuclear plant, it's quite a bit. you would have to disable the cooling systems without the operators knowing it, and maybe the stable communication systems
around the area so that emergency backup is not able to be brought in. that's a lot. and i'm not saying it's impossible but these are the types of scenarios that an outsider would have to, defenses they would have to get through in order to cause a fukushima type scenario. been a fukushima give less severe accident similar to the three-mile accident which is the most severe we've had in the u.s., but that did not result in nearly the same level of threat to the public or emergency response that, say, fukushima did. so while i think it's a very valid question of what you're asking, and it's one that needs to be asked and it's one from operators standpoint, like i said, whether you are talking about a natural disaster or terrorist attack, your defenses ofor your safety systems have to be able to handle all of them. and the u.s. regulators -- euratom also has done a lot on
that. they conducted stress test after fukushima, which like i said it is supposed to stress the reactor, that it could handle very extreme events occurring and not result in offsite release of radiation are of course euratom then has all the robustness built into it or if an operator fails that test, first political pressure is put on them to come in line with the requirements of the stress test, but it has not happened. but if someone to eventually they could be brought to the european court of justice and litigated against. and i assume if you brought to a court of justice that means your reactor has to shut down. again in northeast asia i'm not sure how you put in that robust system. you're going back to the domestic regulars to make sure that they do that. but certainly been in this type of dialogue, hopefully those
types of questions are being addressed and that regulators say we do have regulations that will meet and actually enforce that in our regulated body. >> robert with international investors begin mentioned very briefly that the still a lack of storage for waste materials in this region of the world. i wonder if you could comment on how you see the accumulation of the waste materials and at any point does it become problemat problematic? >> let me add onto that one of the question i have written down was a spent fuel in japan. part of the cycle was this fuel cycles are going to eventually get to but it is only few reactors running, the on site fuels toward spent fuel pools have a lot more capacity. when i going to reach -- is
japan going to reach a point where there's not enough space for spent fuel sight of storage? >> certainly in theory thank you. because, thank you for the question. this is both a safety and a security issue at at fukushima we did see this where reactor core, there were six units on site, for of them were damaged, units one through four. number four was not operating but it's fuel pool was almost full. and, in fact, it was stacked in a way that minute the allowed in the united states. because they feel is coolant, that fuel, because the fuel is still hot even though the raptor is off and it goes through a long ekg process. -- dk -- dk each process. as far as the on site post-award
in japan, like at fukushima those reactors have been running since the late 60s. i think daiichi one came in line armada was 72 a game online. anyway, for about almost 40 years. a lot of fuel has built up. that i mentioned rokkasho has never offered. they've never had commercial reprocessing. so fuels would be sent overseas for reprocessing but france or the united kingdom within reprocess it and send it back. so that as far as getting down to space in the storage pools, there's not much there still because they have decades worth of fuel built the. japan to be honest currently has no truly viable option for dealing with it because rokkasho is close particular reactor called -- in northern japan that is supposed to burn what satu mentioned, the uranium and plutonium mixed oxide fuel. that is under construction.
unclear when it will be finished or licensed. has admitted that 11 tons of separated plutonium which is a huge concern as far as liberation, safety and security does. they have no viable plans to deal with it currently. it is her main issue for the united states that they need to come up with a plan to deal with it. but france who is under contract to reprocess it will keep sending that go back because they don't want to host it. japan has to long-term repository built, so they i think will be forced to come and they're looking at this, to do what's called on site dry cask storage were you take the fuel. it's been sitting in the pool, say 10 years, and she pulled out into put in a dry cask. we are now at a level or iroquois is good enough to keep the pool i can cool. confection. they have a couple of test
facilities. this is done in the united states and this is seen as the intern solution in the united states. especially since -- it is part best at the moment. it might be revised by future administration but not right now. but the u.s. has a lot of space. japan does not have a lot of space. it's densely populated. it has seismic activity. it has volcanic activity. there's not a lot of places to buy we put this ways. that's another reason why they look at reprocessing because they think they can reduce the volume and the toxicity of the ways. south korea's in a similar situation but it's not a seismic jolt or volcanic activity but it is small and area, even highly come more highly densely populated. they don't have a high level waste facility, and some of the
operators, or at least some of the sites it will run out of space in our pool insight five to 10 years. so south korea also has been pushing for doing close cycle were some sort of reprocessing, not necessary close cycle but some reprocessing to reduce the volume and the toxicity of the waste. but even if it happened it would require u.s. permission for it to happen. they need in intern solution. i don't see how, they are pursuing a technology called cairo processing at on a tenure joint fuel cycles do with the united states that will end in 2021, which is about at the point some of the pools will say they will befall. so even if the study is successful and this is okay, we can help commercialize this technology, which i think would be an amazing conclusion to come from the study, they wanted an interim solution because to the amount of waste that we need to
be process will take years to process it. china has a little more flexibility because it's again, it is much more territory, but it plans to reprocess and it doesn't have a large geologic depository get. no one really does. i don't have an edge of because i don't think any other country in the region have a real good answer of what to do with it by do think there will be forced into this on site dry cask storage or maybe a centralized facility. >> i will come to you but let me just, there are some questions in the back. i want to make sure those who i can't see in the back, if you really want to question, please come up to the front because i don't want to deprive you of questions just because i can't see you in the very back. but me start with this gentleman and i will come around the other three hits. please, your name and -- [inaudible] >> -- state foundation to as an american research i guess obviously you don't deal too
much as north korea. there was not much mention of how much they have, what kind of come to the have civilian nuclear all of it is under military, and what are, you know, you didn't mention anything. was it because you didn't want to be -- [inaudible] north korea, which you were not, so, and for effective nuclear cooperation you did north korea to become and i was glad in the last 10 days southern north korea and south korea got together and said okay, we will not send propaganda to north korea said okay, we won't blow you up. satellite. >> -- [inaudible] >> so i don't, i don't know if north korea has specifically mentioned napci. they have responded, not well.
they have called for a number of quite vile things. i won't repeat it since we are on c-span. but i think the suffice to say like you said, the last few days here in the agreement with progress, yes, and the right to kind of snickered because that's the love of progress between the two koreas right now, that you just admit that it's bad that someone got their legs blown off, and in return we will turn off our loudspeakers. the level of cooperation between the two is very low. it was little under the previous administration, too. [inaudible] >> and if you is states hands off i'm sure they will get together spent i personally am
not convinced of that. north korea is the way they are because of their leadership. in my opinion. yes, the u.s. had a role in the way the peninsula was divided and set up by the north korean leadership makes its decisions. but to talk specifically about the nuclear, they have no commercial nuclear industry. there was under the agreed framework in 1994, there was an exchange to suspend their plutonium reprocessing program to build to commercial light water reactors. that was suspended when the bush administration stopped it. so those reactors just buildings really remained there but no activity at them, least not that i know. the main nuclear site is a little bit north of pyongyang. there's a five-megawatt electric
reactor there. that's the old one. they blew up the cooling tower in 2007 or 2008, but they seem to have restored the cooling system, some sort of cooling system for it. but five megawatts is not very much. that's really not, that's not a power reactor. it could power may be the site but i think as far as i know they never connected it to the agreed. i mean, that's another thing -- to their greedy. next to the five-watt megawatt reactor what they call an extreme of the light water reactor. again not big but bigger. they say that the centrifuge enrichment plant is are making fuel for the reactor. but again this is not a huge power producing plant. so if you do have a commercial program is still in the experiment of days, and
demonstration phase. cooperating with north korea on any sort of nuclear issue is extremely challenging to say the least. the six-party talks are about at the same status as yucca mountain here in the united states. i may, i hear it mentioned occasionally t i don't see it restarting anytime soon. and so in napci there's mention of north korea is welcome to join if they want to, but i don't know of any large south korean outrage to get north korea to join. so i didn't mention north korea just because adding to makes the cooperation much more difficult. and i think starting with something for the trilateral cooperation is a good start. but solving the north korea issue is entering problem for the region. >> let me go to the very back and then come up to the front.
let me take those three next and then will bring others as we can fit in. >> jacob. thank you for coming in and talking with us. i was wondering, you mentioned you were not sure of nuclear cooperation could be a soft cooperation issue. what they would you recommend for them, like a new perhaps hopefully not talk shop? we see southeast asia and russia involved with tha it because the in range that any potential accident as well? >> what you think would be the best platform to go about it? >> thank you very much indeed for your question. let me take the other two at this time and then jim will address them all. >> two quick questions. the first question, i've seen at least some commentary on napci
talking about it as not part of south korea's -- which is a fuzzy term but i'm wondering if that's a useful way to think about it, and also has that been pushed by the south korean government to advertise as part of its regional outreach and love leadership? and to what extent because you mentioned it was featured in a speech in 2014 but not present in 2015, has that sort of lost momentum a little bit overtime? secondly looking ahead, because there's been talk about trilateral cooperation in general and northeast asia, and the potential upcoming summit or talks, do you see this issue use of as being part of that trilateral operation or make a paragraph overstatement? overstep probably not a good state to inspect the place to start given all the challenges you talk about? >> ryan shafer. i've got two and to keep them quick. you didn't mention the regional
centers of excellence, which japan, china and korea all have instituted at some level development and testing flickr might be a natural opportunity for cooperation on facing security. and then the second on the question of japan and fuel usage. i think you mentioned japan actually has no plan for getting rid of its plutonium. japan does actually have a plan which is to burn marks fuel so what if you could just address that as well? >> well, that's a lot on your plate. i count three speakers and five questions at a minimum. will come back if we have the time. please bear wit with us. do what you do get through these? we've got about 10 minutes or so spent i think they're a just real simple. spent i want to see how you
answer mox. >> okay. start in the back. from the wisconsin project i first want to say thank you for coming. i interned at the wisconsin project many years ago, about a decade ago now, which makes me feel older. but anyway, i'm glad to see that our position still going strong. what new venue for nuclear safety cooperation, if not napci? well, so i guess i would say that we make a couple of nuclear safety from the napci initiative but let that trm really do it's thing. and i guess i think of been having some productive discussion on emergency management and preparedness and communication. and there is were i said yes, i know high level, but is necessary but i would like some
of the three passed off to the working level committee work regulator to regulator or operator to operator that can be more interaction with having to worry about those a present for the foreign minister need to authorize this. so maybe letting that go on its own after the trm and helping strengthen trm, candidate way to make that enforceable, incentives like if you don't get your communication system online you don't get, we will notify -- something to get them actually to cooperate and come up with a good system are russia and asean, yes, certainly russia is in the area and asean as for the southern chinese plants would be in the area. but i guess again i was not sure about opening up this organization to wide before truly established itself. but maybe take a two track then
and let the trm applause kind of you to talk shop that these countries are aware of what's going on with each other, but trm really focus on the trilateral cooperation to get that going. but certainly having other countries, and at least be aware i have a venue to share some of their thoughts would be a good thing. transparency, well, a lot of these issues though i think you need to be transparent for public acceptance of nuclear power, but i also understand why some countries or even operators don't want to be completely transparent because it opens up and exposes maybe their vulnerabilities, the weaknesses. but at least as a researcher i would ask her all of the more to be put on the trm website. it's pretty vague what's up there right now. least i think have come if you come up committee to join exercise please report on what
you did at the joint exercise otherwise it would just seems like you did a talk shop. so of transparent is not even there yet and it needs to be there. napci as a middle power, yeah, i think certainly the korean president, or korea has talked about this middle power diplomacy for a while now. napci is part of that. being the balancer, maybe you can try to pull the whales in the right direction. i applaud korea for to do. i think it's the right move for them, but am not convinced that china and japan by into. i think their enthusiasm or maybe relative lack of enthusiasm for cooperating on nuclear safety and some of the other issues in napci is a reflection of that. but if south korea, the next
administration can pick up what is left off, i think that's a good sign to show that south korea is serious and that middle power management can work. has napci lost momentum? how come i didn't mention nuclear safety as far as i know but she still talks about regional cooperation. this speech 10 days ago was special because the 70th anniversary of the end of world war ii. pictures also the 50th anniversary of normalized relations between japan and south korea so there's a lot of focus on japan and south korea trying to get the relationship right. rather than the greater regional picture. and nuclear safety at trial -- trilateral nuclear negotiations, i think, we are concerned, we're doing something, but some of these bigger issues as far as getting to diplomatic relations
i would let the high level people take care of that and say we are committed to nuclear safety and we've got this trm that we've tasked with doing that and they're doing that. and ryan, here we are again. the regional centers of excellence, i didn't mention those but you're right, it's a positive element in the region. if come out of the nuclear security summit process under the obama administration. the japanese and korean ones are open. the chinese one should open later this year or early next year. i was just adding the weather was some discussion about the centers of excellence, but partly i think because they could of the nuclear security summit process i would want to give at least a with nuclear security instead of broadening their mission to include nuclear safety.
certainly the intersection between security and safety, but considering they are not up and running yet maybe i would want a less focus on security. so it can want to mention competition and cooperation -- satu mentioned competition. the centers of excellence at least the one in japan and korea talk a lot about how we can help other asian countries with their nuclear programs, develop, so you get non-or bangladesh or turkey. that is not necessarily a lot of talk about what we can do to help korea and china, what we can do to help japan and china. as like a perception of we do nuclear, we have figured it out, so you know we don't need to give trained to koreans on this. i think that's kind of wrongheaded, but i think it's,
some of the talk coming out of the center. but i also think they need this is some feeling of weekend, said if it's japan and we give trained to vietnamese engineers, hey, we also have other vets here, so there's if we pull in vietnamese engineers, they can be influenced by our commercial companies as well. and maybe as a way to get into those markets. you do not find this on the websites obviously but it is kind of some insinuated there that competition for the developing countries. i would encourage them to not do that. that is not their mission, but given the closeness of the nuclear commercial sectors with the governments in some of these countries, it's, i think it's hard for them to delineate that.
in japan's plan for plutonium, you're right, yes, the plan is to send, and i think this is still legally the plan, with a few is a discharge from a japanese reactor, that it has to be marked for reprocessing and that it will go to rokkasho or maybe goes overseas to france. it will be eventually made into box fuel, burned in other reactors that are detonated to receive mox it also has to go into a fast reactor. those are not operational yet even though japan says they remain committed. their experimental fast breeder reactor. but what i said not a viable, i know, i know what the plan is on paper and the policy, but our summary steps, not operational yet and i plan that it seems like an alternative needs to be presented officially in policy.
because of reactors are restarting, that means spent fuel will start retaking they are building up higher and is already 11 tons of plutonium, and to to have the entire backend operational yet. what is the alternate plan to window doing it a lot of time to develop that. so that's what i mean by that. and i think regional country, regional partners would like to see some sort of alternate plan. nuclear has a tendency to the past dependent though and deviating from the past becomes three challenging, especially when so much has been invested financially, politically and legally into the closed cycle in japan. eating out of that is very challenging. and if fukushima doesn't make them deviate, then i'm not sure what we'll. but they're going to reach, i think they will reach a point
where they will have the fuel needs, out of the pools. they won't be able to reprocess it at least right away because rokkasho will be backed up as soon as it opens. it needs to be taken somewhere else. now i deeply japan, they will come up with a solution for it because they have to come and they have shown that they can be inventive and creative. and so they will do it. i would just like to see more talk on it. >> thank you very much, jim. before we close and thank jim, want to thank all of you for coming and highlight, i know we're in the last days of august and we're going to pick up our programs and our seminars after labor day but i just wanted to give ligh light a couple betterd that may be of interest. on september 15 will have a group of three young japanese experts from japan, sort of a new generation of policy influencers and policy specialists and they will speak largely depend on japan's domestic trajectory at a very
interesting time. when people be on finance reform and the finance element of japan's national budget. the second speaker will speak on the energy picture, and a third on the handling of the demographic issue which is the aging population and that that might be addressed. so that's a very timely i think if you. that's on september 15. if you have not signed up for e-mail list we can put you on our e-mail list. you have to sign up for it so that we are not inundated with e-mails. please do so. the second program soon after labor day, september 22, a colleague from the danish embassy actually but in his private capacity will be speaking on his new book on china's strong arm, protecting citizens assets abroad. an interesting examination of china's plans to protect its property, citizens and equities abroad. not least in the context of china's new military strategy
and its impetus on the maritime domain could be of great interest to people, so that september 22. i want to thank you for coming to the east-west center programs. many of our other previous events are on podcast if you were not able to get to them. again, if you'd like to sign up for the e-mail list of our events, publications and special programs, please do so. and i want to thank sarah as always bars -- who is our events courted for giving you some lunch. jim will be after the program for a few moments. i think i'm a little time, don't you? i know some of you want to pick up some questions there and we just don't have time to do any formal session. with that we thank you, jim, for a terrific presentation and handling all the questions. [applause] last th..
festival. >> not the leaders for tomorrow. you may save yourself, i am a youth leader for today and see what i can do. >> the article for the olympic trying to show we had the red-blue map. when he went and interviewed people, the divide was not a chasm. it was a little divide. the political scientists were just in town. the idea of the country itself as polarized as washington is just wrong. >> i hope all the people realize whatever they've done in my something that ought to be recorded and passed on to the next generation. that is the way we learn. we learn for the future by trying to understand the past. all of us have a pass. >> saipan, antoine, you didn't really talk much about on so i'm
glad to see that. >> it goes to almost all the been talking about. we realize there is no way we could tell the whole story. no way we could see short of an encyclopedia or having a story read like the telephone book. of course the telephone book is not a story. >> all the opportunities are open for women now. when alice thomas alike graduated in 1967. there is her teen women in my class of 500. today the law schools are 50/50. the >> key to understanding this he never liked profit above the public good enhanced view belong to the american people for generations unborn and may need to be handed on this place is to awaken the spirit.
>> and made a career out of my love for books and to help spread.i. hope to on the texas book festival and the national book festival. while i love reading problem i never thought i would write a book, certainly not one about myself. >> the goal is in some ways a sense of the two go to the oldest people in our families and find them and get the stories to be able -- i've had a father and a daughter who both came together and after hearing the talk, the daughter said to the father i'm taking you to the coffee shop now you'll tell me the story. >> i think when history looks back with her day plus million people for the health insurance rolls will be quite a change. martin luther king said it bends
>> again come alive for the american bar association homeland security conference. it should start in just a moment. it reminded me continue coverage as a ten-year anniversary of hurricane katrina on c-span. we will show you highlights of the day logs in poznan looking at new orleans recovery and how cities across the country deal with challenges related to the hurricane. that starts at noon eastern c-span. president obama will appear in new orleans making a trip to meet with residents and look at continuing recovery effort and the rebirth. live coverage of the president starts at 5:00 p.m. eastern on our companion now for, c-span.
>> a few moments before the conference on homeland security gets underway hosted by the american bar association. we go now to correcting the administrator craig fugate on the anniversary of hurricane katrina. >> it's good to be with you. and steve clemons, editor of the atlantic and as we discussed these weighty issues so manipulate through, we have someone who had the agency. craig fugate is that minister of payment, probably after katrina's emotional line, federal bureaucracy in history. so it's very good to be with you today. if you look back as i did insert
a look at the press coverage of female comments administrator during that time, the first thing in terms of doing an historical look at this is what went so wrong, why did it go so wrong. >> there is a lot of people who focus on an individual. i've been in the business for a while. we've seen the pattern over and over again. a nation preparing for what we think would happen we are not ready for it. it goes back to hurricane andrew, hurricane hugo and the earthquake. it is a tendency we plan for what we are capable of doing, not what can happen. there's no real mystery what can happen in new orleans. we have the national hurricane conference that you enable talking about many risks. fema had participated with hurricane pam that simulated the
things. the challenge was if he can not execute come you don't plan for anything that can happen. >> you had a discussion before ,-com,-com ma in april of that year that they quickly stimulated out what might happen. >> we looked at worse things. a major hurricane at the river channel overflow in the lovage system and what that would look like. it is not that we new orleans. but if you look at a lot of the plants, and they would plan for what happened in the past and what people thought was reasonable to plan for. mother nature is not reasonable. what you have is everybody thought we will just scale up and it didn't. it was also a very disjointed response and that you have what i call at each level of government has to fail before the next level would kick in. there was too much delay. >> explain what that means, how
action was triggered in the case of katrina. over the failures after the triggering dominoes a request came in. what came to your agency, why did it mobilize slowly? >> it goes back to have restructured. most disasters are handled by government everyday. that is the typical response. occasionally gets to the level where the governor will request the president they need assistance in the request comes up. bad day today works probably for a small flood. it doesn't work in large-scale disasters. each level was planning, responding and waiting to get to the next level. i am not saying he wasn't doing things ahead of time, but the way we set up our stark share was each level of government has to make a formal request to get
the assistance. congress recognized this in the post-katrina reform act and said if we think it's bad the governor is likely to be needing help, why do we have to wait for them to ask for help. but then you lose the disasters you never get back. it isn't so much the lack of resources. decisions being made he will commit resources than you have to make those quickly. he may not have a formal request that if you wait until people know how bad it is, you lose time. unlike other hazards, we have seen hurricanes coming. so what we've learned and what we've done is we are not waiting for storms to get close to make landfall or governors to make requests. we play and how bad it can be, removing resources and get them there in time. it doesn't mean we're taking over. the governor may not need those resources, but time is one aspect you never get back so you
need to be planning for what could happen, not what you're prepared to do and move quickly without waiting for the facts. the levees broke. at that point you need a search and rescue. if that is the request is coming out, before resources across the nation can move. it is the understanding you go by what could happen, not what you're prepared to do. when you see something developing company plan on the worst-case scenarios. we have to plan for worst-case. >> i want to tell the audience we spent some time at the administrator and is the most pleasant gloom and doom guy you can have at the dinner table. it occurred to me you've been a disaster preparedness, disaster recovery all your life thinking about these issues and i read in 2011 you oversaw 87 emergency responses.
so this is part of your dna. both president bush and mitch landrieu just mentioned and president obama both wanted you to come in. you are seen as the disaster guide by just about everyone. what did you think was wrong with the above question over the big things you set out to change in the way we respond. what is the difference today in the dna by fema under here than what we had under michael brown. >> go big, go fast, be smart about it. >> by implication, none of those were the case before. >> they're afraid of making decisions for being wrong. in between big disasters, they want to look at how we reduce costs. getting ready and responding to disasters is not cheap. there's always the budget consideration. this will cost a lot of money to
have capability. what if we can't hear, what if we cut there. you've got more trouble at fema to make the wrong decision they needed to just act. you got paralysis or people were so fearful of being wrong they would wait until they had information to get the right answers. you don't have time to get the right answer. you go with the best answer you have with the information. the lesson i learned, we used to wait until the disaster happened and try to assess how bad it was before we would respond and that is why we used to say the first 72 hours will take that long to know how bad it is. why are we beating 72 hours to find out it's bad. a category three hurricane hitting ponce oporto, why don't we assume it is bad? that is not how the system is set up. the system is insane. we are changing it.
if you have a major hurricane come you better be ready to respond not with the locals say a bad, but the winds died low enough where you can start moving. speed is key. if you change outcomes, speed is key and you have to have resources on the population at risk. this is not rocket science. you've got a risk, population, impacted with the hurricane we see it coming. it doesn't mean there's not tragedy. it doesn't mean there's not the images and we won't have loss of life. they should not be a mystery that we have to wait for somebody to do an assessment before we respond. the lessons i learned in 04, speed was key to find out how bad it is. the lesser you change the outcome. respond like it is bad. you can always go down and reduce. you don't scale up, you don't get time back. the thing i hammered over and over again as we never get time
back. if we think it's bad before the governor mix a formal request, if it is a response, we need to be moving. a lot of disasters help financial recovery. since we do that most of the time, systems gravitate around that. we do the assessments and determine the capability about financial reimbursements. it is about rebuilding after a disaster. the model doesn't work in response. if your system is built around what you do most of the time, that is what you do when you have katrina. you have to change that and build for what the mission is, which has been able to move quickly with little information based as best he can with improbability of impacts you can always scale back. >> one of the impressions people have and i can feel it seen the media coverage of the 10th anniversary talking to people here today, is this a kind of
resources you direct help out the rich white communities and leave behind that are disadvantaged. there is not an effect of distribution. would you agree with that? >> yeah. anyone idea but the maximum amounts assistant this? it goes up by the consumer price index. the total amount is $32,000. to get back, you have to have uninsured losses come uninsured losses, meaning you are covered with flood insurance or homeowners policy. you also have to fail the means test in the next level with a low-interest loan from the small business administration. if you don't qualify where the sba, you may be eligible for fema grants. immigrants were not designed to make people whole although a lot of people come in afterwards and say we will make everybody better.
fema was designed to do the initial response and start the process. that's why it is so important. the mayor was talking about the city. that is not fema dollars he is talking about. you're talking about housing and community development dollars to deal with housing issues. no community had a housing issue and got better because you had a hurricane or earthquake. we don't do with the job situation. we don't deal with education and high school dropout rate. we don't fix the preexisting conditions in our programs never designed to solve that. ours is like the initial response to give somebody some help and a place to live in some initial assistance. congress never built fema to make people whole. your analogy that we go, the poor get the most help because they don't qualify. they don't have insurance.
poverty is one of the single biggest factors of impacted disasters of not being able to recover. the other thing was that middle-class. when they lost their homes they were no longer middle-class. you can weather disasters better than the poor. that is just a fact of life. the way programs are designed, we don't exist preexisting conditions that we will not make people whole. we were designed to be a bridge and that's why it's so important one of the things congress directed us to do is if you will they look at fema programs and the type of katrina response be dealt with, communities won't recover because you have to look at community needs as a whole. fema has a small piece and not. but we've been asked to do is the acronym of federal agencies. are we addressing the underlying
issues. is there affordable housing, is their jobs, is the education system such. people love because schools are coming back. there is no place to stay. it wasn't safe in many areas. if you want to go back, you have to have a place to live you can afford. you have to have a job. you have to have a school system you're willing to put your kids then. these are the things you have to establish. but we did not fit together in the aftermath of katrina with a blueprint to work with the local governments on how to do that. it was kind of ad hoc. we missed too many opportunities. we are right 10 years and still working on resolving the issue. this is 10 years later. >> you said katrina is not a closed operation. you just open up hundreds of thousands could come back and be reviewed. we tell you some things about
how you thought fema had long made a mistake of competing with a year. he had this wonderful thing called the waffle house index. give us a 452nd -- >> i hope you've enjoyed our practice and continue to enjoy it if you would like. i want to welcome you to the 10th annual home security law institute and its my pleasure to be part of the program for the last 10 years. i want to welcome you to this year's program. i want to thank -- my name is joe with lee for purposes of introducing myself and am delighted to see you all here this morning. i want to thank emily montgomery emily is attending a more important duty. it's a longer introduction shall
be back with us. i am really delighted to have josh madeley of oklahoma city school of law as my vice chair for the program. josh is sitting here. thank you for all you've done. the oklahoma city school of law was the 20th europe serve as, the worst act of domestic terrorism. the federal building in oklahoma city. the first inclination foreign terrorism into u.s. citizen and josh was honored by being appointed director center of homeland security. the building was bombed for those of you in the room that remember it.
the homeland security in oklahoma city school of law. the analysis matters -- josh holds a master of law degree from washington in oklahoma city school of law. i want to introduce you as the vice chair. thank you for the hard work you put in the program this year. round of applause. [applause] there are two honorary vice chairs on the program this year. chad boudreaux and alan wolf. and if they're available to be with us this morning. the administrative law session has been the home for the last 10 years and there's a number of the audience so let me thank you for your support of the program. when you came in today and register again that what the
fashion director. he also met with angela p. charlie is their program planner and alicia dixon who is their program associate. and kiefer has enlisted her son to help out with the program. those are the fantastic four. they will put together today's event. when you have a moment, you are out there signing in, please thank them. a lot of this is very hard to do and i'm really delighted to have their support for the last 10 years. we have a number of aba cosponsors listed in the program material if you have a brochure in your plastic envelope, look inside for a number of other sections that support the program so i am delighted they continue to support us. we have in-kind sponsors and financial others. we were able to keep our tuition to a substantially lower level then it really would we if we
didn't have the sponsors of go up. i am delighted my law firm continues to be a premier sponsor of the program and we had the other sponsors you see listed here. they're in-kind contributions sometimes getting word out to those of you in the audience about the program and in today's cyberworld you would think it would be easy to share good news on a program like this. some of you heard about it by word of mouth some of you heard about the program reorganization. i find i get hundreds of e-mails every day and i am mostly pushing the lead and i'm guessing that it's probably true of many of you in this room. i'm glad she didn't push delete. said these organizations make the program possible. if you meet some of these folks,
the others listed on here. i will mention this morning a tragedy occurred, one of our greatest sponsors lost its president, ceo who's been a longtime good friend of the program and has been tremendous in terms of sponsorship or regrettably david lost his life in the aftermath of an airplane accident just last week. thoughts and prayers go to the family and many members of his family still suffering from the loss of david who is a tremendous supporter of the program. i want to thank each of you again for being here today because without you the program could not have been possible. your involvement of homeland security is an important way back when i was starting the program, phil perry